The debate inside the Trump administration over how to deal with Iran is no longer simply about how the current conflict should end. It is increasingly about what kind of relationship Washington wants with Tehran — and whether a temporary agreement could ultimately strengthen Iran rather than weaken it.
World | Geopolitics | Middle East
According to the source analysis provided to AALIMI NATION, two competing approaches have emerged inside Washington. One favours an interim arrangement focused on the Strait of Hormuz and a pause in the conflict. The other argues that military and economic pressure should continue until Washington secures substantive concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme, missiles, drones and regional proxy network.
At the centre of the dispute is a fundamental question:
If the war was launched to constrain Iran’s military and regional capabilities, could an incomplete agreement ultimately leave Tehran in a stronger strategic position?
A dispute over the endgame
The analysis argues that Vice President JD Vance, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have favoured an approach that would prioritise an interim arrangement, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz.
The concern among critics of that approach is that Iran could emerge from the conflict with an enhanced role in the administration and security of the strategic waterway — something that was not necessarily part of the original objectives of the military campaign.
Iran does not exercise unilateral control over the entire Strait of Hormuz. However, any agreement giving Tehran a major role in managing shipping, monitoring traffic or influencing the financial and political arrangements surrounding the waterway could significantly increase its strategic leverage.
That is why the question of who is actually gaining from a potential agreement has become increasingly important.
The alternative inside Washington
Another faction within the Trump administration reportedly favours maintaining both military and economic pressure.
This camp includes Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and elements of the U.S. military establishment. Their argument is that Washington should consolidate the gains achieved through the campaign rather than conclude an agreement that leaves the most difficult issues unresolved.
The disagreement therefore goes beyond personalities.
It represents two different schools of thought about Iran.
One approach is based on reaching a workable coexistence with Tehran, even if some of the most difficult issues are postponed. The other seeks a deeper transformation of Iran’s strategic behaviour before the pressure is reduced.
Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes remain unresolved
The central concern is what happens to the issues that have driven the confrontation in the first place.
If a temporary agreement leaves Iran’s nuclear programme, ballistic missiles, drone production and regional proxy network largely unresolved, critics argue that Tehran could use the pause to rebuild its capabilities.
The analysis suggests that Iran could interpret the end of intense military pressure not as a reason to change course, but as evidence that its strategy of resistance and endurance has produced results.
That would create a fundamental contradiction for Washington.
A campaign launched with the objective of limiting Iran’s military reach could ultimately provide Tehran with the time and political space needed to rebuild.
The Gulf states could pay the price
The consequences would not be limited to Washington and Tehran.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states have already invested heavily in air-defence systems, missile interceptors and counter-drone capabilities. These systems have been required to protect critical infrastructure from attacks during the conflict.
The financial burden is considerable.
Billions of dollars that Gulf governments intended for economic diversification, infrastructure and social development could instead be redirected towards defence and security.
For countries pursuing ambitious economic transformation programmes, that could become a significant strategic cost.
The larger concern is whether Gulf governments could eventually question the reliability of their long-standing security relationship with Washington if they believe they have been forced to bear the consequences of a conflict they did not choose.
Hormuz and the wider maritime picture
The Strait of Hormuz is not merely an Iranian security issue. It is one of the world's most important energy corridors.
Any agreement that gives Tehran a greater role in the management of the waterway could therefore have implications far beyond Iran.
The analysis also points to the role of the Houthis in Yemen and the importance of the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping routes. If Iran gains greater influence over Hormuz while its regional allies retain the ability to threaten other maritime chokepoints, Gulf states could face a more complicated security environment after the war.
For the Gulf economies, secure maritime routes are essential not only for oil exports but also for wider international trade.
Two competing regional models
The confrontation also highlights the contrasting political and economic models emerging in the Gulf and Iran.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states have invested heavily in economic diversification, international investment, tourism, technology and social reforms.
Iran, meanwhile, has continued to rely on a regional strategy built around its Revolutionary Guard Corps, armed partners and proxy networks.
The source analysis argues that the success of the Gulf's economic-development model represents a challenge to Iran's ideological and strategic influence, while Iran's military capabilities remain a direct security challenge for the Gulf states.
What happens if Washington eases pressure?
The most consequential decision may now belong to President Trump.
If Washington maintains military and economic pressure until Tehran makes meaningful concessions, the United States could attempt to reshape the strategic balance between the two countries.
But if Washington chooses an interim agreement that postpones the most difficult questions, Iran could gain time to rebuild its military capabilities and regional networks.
That would raise a difficult question for the administration:
Was the war intended to force Iran to change its behaviour — or simply to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table?
The answer matters because the two objectives can produce very different outcomes.
Gulf states need more strategic options
The analysis argues that Gulf countries should not respond by simply abandoning their relationship with Washington and turning entirely towards China. China can provide major economic, financial and technological partnerships, but it is not currently a comprehensive military substitute for the United States.
Instead, Gulf states may need to develop stronger regional defence arrangements while maintaining their strategic relationship with Washington.
That could include greater cooperation on air and missile defence, maritime security, protection of energy infrastructure and the development of alternative trade and energy routes that reduce dependence on individual chokepoints.
The objective would not necessarily be to distance themselves from America.
It would be to reduce the cost of excessive dependence on any single security provider.
The decision ahead
The next phase of the conflict may therefore be determined not only by what Iran is willing to concede, but by what Washington is willing to accept.
A deal that leaves the central strategic questions unresolved could bring an immediate reduction in fighting but create a new security problem later.
For Iran, the calculation is equally significant. If Tehran concludes that endurance and military pressure ultimately produce political concessions, it may have little incentive to fundamentally alter the strategy that has shaped its regional policy for decades.
The ultimate question is therefore not simply who surrenders.
It is who emerges from the war with greater strategic freedom.
And that answer may depend less on the battlefield than on the terms written into whatever agreement comes next.
Source: Raghida Dergham, Al Arabiya adviser and international affairs columnist.
